Though it has seldom
been mentioned in the historical recounts of either country, the alliance
between China and Vietnam should occupy a big part in Asian history during the
cold war era. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) had made great sacrifices in
its determination to support the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the
war against the United States and France. According to the first chapter of the
book, they included foregoing recognition from the latter of China as an
independent country. The interests of the Chinese administration led by Mao
Zedong, however, run deeper than the passion to help protect a weaker brother.
Mao was constantly worried over the possibility of western invasion of fronts
bordering China. They included Vietnam, Taiwan and Korea. His concern was the
threat likely to come from Indochina as well as KMT forces operating in
Vietnam. In addition, he believed that China had a responsibility to defeat
imperialism and establish communism as well as lead a new revolution. Thus, he
ensured that Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh received support in form of food,
clothes, medicine and military advice.
Details of Vietnamese
and French war are contained in the second chapter. The Vietnamese fighting
unit, the Viet Minh trounced French forces in the First Indochina war. The
victory was largely due to France’s mistakes in relation to understanding the
social and political changes underway, hesitance to grant freedom to political
groupings as well as lack of support to its military leaders. Other suggestions
include the popularity of Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, among the population.
There is also writing advancing the opinion that the Vietnamese party’s terrorism
policy as well as its sophisticated organization lend a hand in ensuring
victory. What is for sure, however, is the fact that China’s support played a
big part in achievement of the victory. Of importance is the military and
political aid advanced to the Viet Minh. Beijing not only provided military
weapons but also the advice for the Vietnamese fighting units. In addition, the
fact that the Viet Minh was fighting for independence – a just cause – greatly
contributed to attainment of victory. The pressure put on Vietnam by China to
abandon its efforts to unify the country during the Geneva Conference was,
however, the onset of ill-feelings between the two allies.
The third chapter
explains that after the Geneva Conference, China was intent on promoting peace
between nations. The country sought to
counter the isolation policy brought against by the U.S. by courting Cambodia
and Laos neutralist governments as well as helping Vietnam’s efforts in
rebuilding its economy and consolidation of power. In addition, China spared no
effort in attempting to get rid of the hostility between the Laos and the DRV. Mao
especially worked hard in ensuring that the Asian countries did not have any
military cooperation with the U.S, advocating instead for France. He, however,
was wary of American retaliation especially during the time of domestic
reconstruction. China remained a close ally of the DRV, offering to help
mitigate the effects of the war by aiding in reconstruction of the transport
system, relieving of famine, reviving agriculture and reinforcing the armed
forces. In addition, Beijing sent a team of financial experts to North Vietnam
to provide economic advice. The DRV also sought economic assistance and advice
from the Soviet Union. It was, in fact, suggested that the country had moved
its loyalties from to Moscow from Beijing in the quest to obtain financial
assistance. The DRV leaders had also abandoned the Chinese model in land reform
in favor of the Russian one. The DRV, however, maintained cordial relations with
China, attempting to mend bridges when the relationship between the two
countries fell apart after Khrushchev took over from Stalin.
In 1961, a conflict
between the major world powers loomed as a result of civil war between
neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma, General Phoumi Nosavan who was aligned to
the right and Pathet Lao who was left-winged. The events are explained in the
fourth chapter. In the Geneva conference
convened to find a solution to the conflict, China was represented by a large
delegation. The East-West meeting was the first in which China had sent
representatives since the Geneva Conference of 1954. Before the meeting, In the
fourth chapter, Beijing raised concerns on the intent of the U.S in providing
military and economic aid to Lao. Zhou Elai confided with Ho Chi Minh on the
fears of China regarding American influence on Lao. He sought to counter the
possibility of drawing the country into SEATO. The Chinese were concerned about
the security threat posed by Laos as well as the influence of the later on
South Vietnam. During the Geneva meeting, Beijing closely worked with Hanoi in
barring the way for U.S intervention by drawing interest to aggression brought
by the Americans to Indochina and insisting that Laotians should solve their own
problems.
The change of U.S
administration from Eisenhower to Kennedy came with the change of priorities on
the country’s support as explained in the fifth chapter. President Kennedy
concentrated his efforts on South Vietnam, neglecting Laos. Mao supported the
struggle of the South Vietnamese people against American-sponsored Saigon.
Chinese leaders, however, advised caution on the size of operations military
operations carried out by the DRV in the South. This was largely because China
was at the time experiencing grave economic problems at home. Therefore, the
leaders feared that any big battles waged by the Vietnamese communists would
bring them into confrontation with the United States and lead to further ruin.
Beijing, nevertheless, supported North Vietnam with weapons that would be used
for guerilla warfare in South Vietnam. The move was largely a result of fears
of U.S. attack on DRV. This was the period in which the gap between China and
Russia widened while difference between the latter and DRV emerged as a result
of reluctance to provide support for the Asian country by Moscow.
In the sixth chapter, the
U.S finally shifted its focus towards Hanoi in 1964. It was mainly guided by
supplies and men infiltrating the South from the North. The country expanded
its operations into DRV, with commando raids, dropping propaganda leaflets and
intelligence over-flights. The North Vietnamese government, however, did not
cede ground, insisting that it was helping the liberation struggle in the
South. Beijing also pledged support for its DRV ally, promising to fight
together against the enemy. In the end, the U.S intensified its military
campaign against Vietnam, prompting China to increase its military support for
DRV and its own military preparedness in the provinces located in the south. When
the war between North Vietnam and the U.S escalated, China – upon request –
sent in military weapons, personnel and other kinds of aid including food,
clothing and mosquito nets. The intervention by China put the country under
risk of war with the U.S. It was during the war that discord between China and
DRV emerged. While the DRV was in dire need of Chinese support, the country’s
cultural pride limited access of the Chinese personnel to the populations, even
to the extent of preventing provision of medical aid to Vietnamese civilians.
The seventh chapter
talks about the emergency of criticism of U.S military campaigns in Vietnam
from home. President had no choice but to make attempts at a peace agreement.
Other quarters including Paris, London, Moscow and several British Commonwealth
countries also expressed the need for peace. China, however, was strongly
against any peace talks between Washington and Hanoi. The country’s leaders
dreaded any situation that would bring Washington and Moscow together. They
were afraid that if the two powers found a settlement of the conflict in
Vietnam, Chinese influence on Asia would be diminished and the Soviet Union and
the U.S would claim authority on the region. A number of emissaries were sent to the region
to try and find a solution that would bring peace in the region. They included
former British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker and Ghanaian President Kwame
Nkrumah. The DRV finally realized that it was a small poor country pitted
against a major power and finally opened talks, beginning the end to the war
and straining the relationship between it and its long-time Beijing allies.
In the eighth chapter
the deterioration of relationships between China and the Soviet Union is
detailed. In addition, the U.S began withdrawing from South Vietnam. The interests of Beijing, on the other hand,
differed from those of Hanoi. While the latter viewed the U.S as a dangerous
enemy, China regarded the U.S as a tool for counterbalancing of the influence of
the Soviet Union. The DRV launched what was known as the Tet offensive which
aimed at hastening the withdrawal of the U.S troops and establishment of NLF-controlled
coalition government. China, however, was opposed to the offensive since it did
not take the revolutionary direction envisioned by Mao. Beijing received
criticism from Hanoi in the form of accusations of providing Hanoi with weapons
that did not much help their efforts in war. In addition, China was accused of
opposing the end to the Vietnam war for its own benefits in terms of gaining
publicity, weakening the Vietnamese forces and intensification of the campaign
against the Soviet Union.
The ninth chapter shows the birth of
new relations between Beijing and Washington. President Nixon expressed his
intention to send an envoy to Beijing. In answer, Chinese leadership welcomed
the move with Mao saying that he would be delighted to have a meeting with
Nixon. America, however, continued to support South Vietnam this time in
invading Lao. Nixon was quick to reassure Beijing that the war was not targeted
at China but at the North Vietnamese. While Beijing condemned the invasion, it
was not ready to take any steps. Still China constantly assured the DVR that
its friendship with the U.S would in no way undermine the relationship between
the two Asian countries. The North Vietnamese, however, had already inevitably
arrived at the conclusion that China was no longer interested in revolutionary
alliance and that it preferred the relationship with America.
The book no doubt reveals the crafty
means by which China sought to stamp its authority not only on Asia politics
but the world arena. The country invested huge amounts of human and material
resources in the war against France and the U.S. While the open agenda was to
support the Vietnamese in the fight for their independence and autonomy, the
hidden one aimed at advancing ideological and geopolitical interests especially
in pushing away imperialistic powers from the region. Chinese leaders also believed
that it was their duty to establish a new world order based on communism. The
extent to which the country was determined to guard its interests is evidenced
by the readiness with which it courted its former foe in an attempt to counterbalance
Soviet influence with disregard for the feelings of its former North Vietnamese
ally.
